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1n this paper we present data collected by the banking supervision authorities on
banks' nonperforming assets and loan losses with a view to establishing a consis-
tent database for analysing the condition of Finnish banks and firms.
Over the past couple af years same FIM 100 billion's worth af banks'
exposures have been nonperforming, for shorter or longer periads af time. At the
end af1992 banks' nonperforming assets amounted to FIM 55 billion, after write-
offs af FIM 22 billion for the year. Firms in the domestic sector of the economy
are facing the most difficult debt-servicing problems; nonperforming assets
amounted to some 15 per cent ofexposures on average. For manufacturing firms,
the figure was less than five per cent.
The relatively stronger position afmanufacturing firms is also clearly seen in
the breakdown of loan losses by industry. These firms accounted for only just
over 10 per cent af loan losses attributable to domestic firms. Construction and
real estate business accounted for 45 per cent af the tota1. Although a fifth af
nonperforming loans were accounted far by households, these loans have not
caused the banks' loan lasses to any great extent so faf. 1n 1992 they accounted
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51 Introduction
After the economy had entered into a deep reeessioll; at the beginning of the
1990s, the banks' fina.ncial problems began to worsen, as more and more af their
customers ran into debt-servicing difficulties. Excessive investment by firms in the
domestic sector has proven to he a particularly high-risk area. Lending by
domestic financial institutions ta finance these investments expanded by some
FIM 100 billian after the mid-1980s. The vast majarity afthis amount was lent by
banks. In competing for market share, the banks relaxed their eredit-granting
standards and partly lost control af the credit risks attached to banking.
Economic policy also had a significant impact on economic development in
the late 1980s and early 1990s. The deregulatian af financial markets, together
with a fiscal policy that was tao loose considering the conditions prevailing at the
time, led to an overheating of the economy, particularly in 1988 and 1989. At the
same time, increased domestie demand led ta a widening of the eurrent aceount
deficit. The subsequent tightening af monetary policy was tao late ta adequately
check the overheated economy.
With the onset af the 1990s, domestic dernand began ta decline as a result af
a sharp rise in real interest rates and adjustment to over-indebtedness, at the same
time as trade with the Soviet Union collapsed. Because firms' competitiveness had
eroded during the boom years and demand was slack, exports ta western markets
could not compensate for the 10ss in domestic demand. Output began ta decline.
With the deeline in demand, many firms have had ta face the faet that their
expectations conceming the future had been over- optimistic. For those providing
the financing, this has meant an increase in nonperforming assets and falling
eollateral values.
The decline in bank profitability, which started in 1989, came to a head in
1992 when banking groups' eombined losses amounted ta more than FIM 20
billion. The prime reasons for the losses were writedowns on loans and guarantees
as well as lower net income from financial operations due to the increase in
nonperforming assets.
This paper examines banks' risk exposures and credit losses by sector and
industry. The banking" groups report monthly to the Banking Supervision Office
on their nonperforming loans and bank guarantees and other zero-interest assets.
They repart to the Bank af Finland three times a year on their nonperforming
assets, by industry.
72 Definitions
2.1 Nonperforming loans and guarantees and other
zero-interest assets
Nonperforming loans and guarantees and ather zero-interest assets are defined by
Banking Supervisian Office regulation 5.07/5.2.93. If the payment af interest,
principle ar any part thereof on an asset has been in arrears for three months, the
entire principal is ta .be classified as nonperforming, regardless af the financing
instrument or balance-sheet item involved. Claims on bankrupts' estates are ta be
classified irnmediately as nonperforrning. For statistical purposes, ather zero-
interest assets, Le. separately reported claims originally agreed to bear no interest,
are treated as nbnperforming assets.
If a cust0l11;er has not been able ta make principaI payments on alaan but has
paid the interest as due and there is a written agreement between the bank and the
customer on a new payment schedule, the asset is not classified as nonperforming.
If a court of law has approved a reorganization pIan or debt rescheduling for the
customer, the asset is removed from the nonperforming category. The asset is
reclassified, in accordance with the above criteria, if the customer is unable to
carry out the approved pIan.
A bank guarantee is classified as nonperforming immediately after the bank
has effected the payment arising from it. If the bank has made only a partial
payment in respect af a guarantee, only the paid amount is classified as nonperfor-
ming.
2.2 Loan losses
The regulatians issued by the Banking Supervision Office also mention actual and
probable laan losses, which are deducted from nonperforming assets. Changes
during the year in nanperforrning assets are thus to be monitored together with the
related write-offs on loans and guarantees, Le. as gross figures (Chart 1).
According to accounting regulation 3.01/23.12.92 on financial statements, a
loan loss must be written off when it has become clear that the claim is not
collectable. Laan losses must a1so he written off if
the asset is nonperforming and the customer's ability to pay is not expected
to improve within two years and
the probable market vaIue of the collateraI does not cover the claim and the
vaIue is not expected to increase sufficiently within five years.
8This means that accounting regulations define not only actual loan losses but
also probable loan losses which are deducted from the asset portfolio. Currently,
ali Finnish banks writedown their loan portfolios at least three times a year.
In 1992 for the first time, the banks wrote off a significant partion of their
probable loan losses in addition ta their actual loan losses. The banks applied the
accounting regulations afthe Banking Supervision Office in accordance with their
own practices.
Chart 1. Nonperforming assets and write-offs on loans and
guarantees of banking groups (inel. savings and
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2.3 International comparison af definitions
Nonperforming assets
According to Finnish and Norwegian definitions, an asset is ta be classified as
nonperforming if interest or principal payments are in arrears for at least three
months. In Sweden a payment disruption is allowed for only two months. In Japan
an asset is nonperforming if the interest has been in arrears for at least six months.
In the United Kingdom nonperforming assets are only mentioned in accounting
instructions; there is no precise definition.
In th.e Nordic countries an off-balance-sheet bank guarantee becomes a
nonperforming asset immediately the bank effects payment on the basis of the
guarantee.
9Accounting regulations in Sweden and Norway recognize the concept of a
"soft loan". This is a loan on which a bank has agreed ta set the interest payable
at a rate substantially below the market rate because af the customer's inability to
pay. The concept afother zero-interest assets is not recognized outside afFinland.
These can, hawever, be considered as soft loans.
1n Sweden problem assets are reported as the sum of nonperforming'assets
and soft loans. 1n Norway soft loans are not included in nonperforming assets. 1n
Finland other zero-interest assets (soft loans) are included in the concept of non-
performing assets. The Swedish concept af problem assets is thus the broadest
concept applied in the Nordic countries.
The Japanese Ministry af Finance defines narrow and broad concepts of
banks' nonperforming assets. The narrow concept includes only assets on which
the interest has been in arrears for a specified period. The braad concept also
includes soft loans.
Writing off loan losses
International accounting treatment afloan losses recognizes the concepts afactual
laan loss, probable loan 10ss (Le. specific loan loss provision) and a general loan
10ss provision. These three items reduce the size af the laan portfolio in the
financial statements and are written off as loan losses. Although the general loan
10ss provisian is deducted from assets and therefore also fram the balance sheet,
it can be included in supplementary (Tier 2) capital in a bank's capital adequacy
calculation
1
• The practice thus increases the amount afwrite-offs and reduces the
amount af risk-weighted assets.
1n Finland, under current accounting regulations actual and probable loan
losses are not reported separately. The Finnish concept af laan lass reserves on the
liabilities side of the balance sheet is not recognized as such elsewhere.
A comparison af current accounting standards in different countries shows
that rules as to when loan losses can or must be written off are often ambiguous.
Nor do the rules set upper limits on the amount of write-offs.
Because of this "flexibility" in accounting standards, the write-off policy
applied by a bank largely depends on the discretion af the banks' management
and auditors. This makes comparisan difficult even between banks operating in the
same country. Variations in the way loans are written off affect not only banks'
financial results but also their capital adequacy.
The rules for writedowns on laan losses are, however, considerably more
stringent in Norway than in Sweden or Finland. For example, in Norway the
interest revenue lost in "soft loans" must be written off.





Because definitions af nonperforming assets differ at least to some extent from
country ta country, precise international comparisons are impossible. With respect
to the banking crisis in Finland, however, a breakdown by industry provides a
good basis for an analytical study.
In the remainder af this paper, we ilse three different definitions for banks'
assets and commitments. The balance-sheet item loans to the publie includes
banks' domestic and fareign 10ans. In addition, the stock of loans includes bonds
held as investments. Exposures is the braadest concept, defined here as the total
stock af loans plus guarantees
2
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The data on Finland have been collected from consolidated deposit banking
groups, including the Iacal savings and cooperative banks. As sectoral data on the
small laeal banks is missing, we have made estimates based on data from other
banks. 1n terms: af the overall picture and conclusions to he drawn, the missing
data is afno consequence. The data used for Nordic country comparisons are from
parent banks.
3 Banks' nonperforming assets
3.1 Growth af nonperforming assets
After the write-offs af FIM 22 billion, banks' nonperforming assets amounted to
FIM 55 billion at the end af 1992, ar nearly 10 per cent af their loans and
guarantees. Nonperforming assets stood at some FIM 42 billion at end-1991,
which means that they grew by about FIM 35 billion in 1992, in gross terms3.
The annual growth of nonperforming assets by sector and industry is based
solely on data on some major commercial banks (Table 1). On the basis of this
data, it appears that economic conditions affected firms and households with equal
The definition used here is deficient in that it does not include guarantees issued by savings
and caoperative banks in respect of loans made by their respective central monetary institutions
(groups).
With respect to manufacturing, nonperforming assets grew by even more since the sales of
collateral and restructuring decreased the stock of nonperforming assets. In some cases a1so the
customer's ability to pay improved. Flow data are not available far nonperforming assets. On the
basis af data on certain banks, we estimate the flow af new nonperfarming assets far 1992 to be
some FIM 50 billion.
11force in 1992: gross nonperforming assets for both sectors grew by 50 per cent.
Of course, in absolute terms, the debt problems af firms grew much more
4
•
Foreign nonperforming assets doubled in 1992. This was mainly because
loans ta C.I.S. countries were classified as nonperforming in that year. The growth
rate for other foreign nonperforming assets was below the corresponding domestic
rate. Nonetheless, it is clear from the amount af such nonperforming assets that
banks' fareign assets have not been risk-free. Even excluding the C.I.S. countries,
the partion af laans and guarantees that was nonperforming was greater in the
fareign categary than in the dornestic category.
Table 1. Breakdown of Major Banking Groups'
Nonperforming Assets and Write-offs,
1991-1992
1991 Nonperforming assets Write-offs on loans and
guarantees
Sector FIM billion % FIM billion %
Corporate 16 63.5 6 62.9
Household 4 14.4 0 3.9
Other domestic
1 1 2.0 1 7.4
Foreign 5 20.1 2 25.8
AlI sectors 26 100.0 9 100.0
1992 Nonperforrning assets Write-offs on loans and
guarantees
Sector FIM billion % FIM billion %
Corporate 17 54.6 8 60.4
Household 5 15.5 1 6.1
Other domestic
1 2 5.4 2 14.7
Foreign 7 24.5 2 18.8
AlI sectors 31 100.0 13 100.0
1 Incl. financial institutions, general government and non-profit institutions.
A more accurate picture of nonperforming assets as regards domestic firms is obtained by
means of an industry breakdown. In percentage terms, the greatest increase in banks' nonperfor-
ming assets was due to construction. The growth rate for nonperforming assets was a1so above the
average for manufacturers. On the other hand, the debt problem grew at a below-average rate for
real estate business. This may largely be the result of the faet that real estate prices began to
decline already in 1990, so that in this category the problem came to a head in 1991.
123.2 Structure af nonperforming assets
Nearly 60 per cent af the FIM 55 billion worth af nonperforming assets as afend-
1992 was accounted for by domestic firms (Table 2). The share ofhouseholds was
slightly over 20 per cent; foreign countries accounted for some 14 per cent. FIM
10 biIlion worth of domestic nonperfarming assets was denominated in fareign
currencies.
An examinatian af nanperforming assets in relation to banks' overall
exposures clearly reveals the problem areas and the division af the economy into
open and domestic sectars. With respect to manufacturing, less than five per cent
of the total amount of exposures is nonperforming, whereas, for example, the
figure for constructian is nearly 20 per cent (Table 3).
This situation may be partly explained by anather factar: a simple bipartite
separation of firms on the basis af size. Large firms are able to arrange their
financing so that their loans do not become nonperforming. Of course, this does
not necessarily mean that large firms are not facing profitability prablems just as
serious as those af small and medium-sized firms.
Table 2. Breakdown of Banking Groups' Total Exposures,
Nonperforming Assets and Write-offs on Loans and
Guarantees, 31 December 1992
TotaI exposures Nonperforming Write-offs on
assets loans and
guarantees
Seetor FIM % FIM % FIM %
billion billion billion
Corporate 268 45.1 32 58.9 17 71.8
of which
Manufacturing 89 14.9 4 7.5 2 8.8
Construction 29 5.0 6 10.1 3 11.8
Trade, restaurants & hotels 58 9.7 7 13.4 3 14.2
Real estate business 34 5.7 9 16.4 5 20.5
Other 58 9.8 6 11.5 4 16.5
HousehoId 192 32.3 12 21.1 1 6.6
Other domestic
1 57 9.5 3 6.1 2 10.6
Foreign 78 13.1 8 13.9 2 11.0
AlI sectors 595 100.0 55 100.0 22 100.0
1 Ine!. financial institutions, general government and non-profit institutiollS.
13Table 3. Banking Groups' Nonperforming Assets and Write-
offs on Loans and Guarantees, 31 December 1992
Guarantees Nonperfor- Write-offs Write-offs
in relation to ming assets on loans and on loans and
totaI in relation ta guarantees guarantees
exposures total in reIation to in relation to
exposures totaI gross non-
exposures performing
assets
Sector % % % %
Corporate 28.7 12.1 5.9 32.7
af which
Manufacturing 36.2 4.7 2.2
-- 31.8
Construction 38.0 18.8 8.8 31.8
Trade, restaurants & hotels 24.4 12.7 5.4 29.8
Real estate business 16.8 26.8 13.4 33.2
Other 23.9 10.9 6.3 36.5
Household 2.6 6.1 0.8 11.2
Other domestic
1 20.0 6.0 4.1 40.7
Foreign 10.6 9.8 3.1 24.0
AlI sectors 17.1 9.3 3.7 28.5
1 Jncl. financial institutions, general government and non-profit institutions.
A key faetor in determining whether a firm's debt becomes nonperforming is
the manner in which the financing entity responds to the problems involved.
Hence, the relatively smaller share ofnonperfarming assets in manufacturing firrns
could also be explained by the faet that the banks' exposures to large firms in the
manufacturing sector are much bigger than the average.
The debt problems ofthe eeonomy's damestic seetar are largely explained by
the expansion af debt in the latter half af the 1980s; the greater the relative
expansian afdebt, the greater the difficulty now eneountered by firms on average
in that particular industrial sector. This is largely explained by the decline in real
terms in domestic demand, which is now at the level af 1986-1987. As regards the
current level of dwelling and real estate prices, one must go back even farther in
time to find a corresponding level. The situation is worst in real estate business,
where some 40 per cent af banks' exposures were either nonperforming ar written
off. ln eonstruction, the situation is scarcely any better, especially eonsidering the
restrueturing af the sector.
Of households' (ineL self-employed) bank loans, some six per cent were
nonperforming at end-1992. Thus, on the basis af available data, households' debt
problems are relatively worse than those of manufacturing firms. The growth of
unemployment and lengthening af its duratian as well as the steps for consalida-
ting state finances point ta a further worsening af hauseholds' debt problems, at
least for this and next year.
14According to some estimates, the average debt af wage-earner househalds
facing debt-service problems is sorne FIM 150 000; for self-employed the figure
is two ar three times higher. Using these figures it ean be estimated that same
60 000 househalds are facing immediate debt-servicing prablems.
4 Banks' loan losses
The worsening afbanks' financial performanee stems from the large write-offs on
loans and guarantees, which reflect the plight of the Finnish economy as well as
firms' profitability and debt-servieing problems. Banks' loan losses inereased to
some FIM 22 billion in 1992 as campared ta FIM 8 billion in 1991. In 1992
write-offs accounted for 3.7 per cent af banks' nearly FIM 600 billion of
expasures and 4.5 per cent af the stock of loans.
The divergence in the performanee of the domestie and foreign sectors ofthe
economy is alsa seen io the breakdown of loan losses by industry. Only somewhat
more than a tenth af write-affs caused by domestic firrns were attributable to
manufacturing firms, even though they aeeounted for about a third af banks'
expasures ta firms. Relative ta total exposures to manufacturing firms, only just
over two per eent were written off in 1992, whereas the figure for firms in
construction and real estate was some 10 per cent. Construction and real estate
business accounted for nearly a quarter of banks' exposures to darnestic firms and
45 per cent af the corresponding write-affs (Charts 2 and 3).
Banks wrote off slightly more than FIM 6 billion worth af guarantees ta
domestic firms in 1992. There are large differences between industries in banks'
write-offs on the Ioans and on the guarantees. Real estate business aceaunted for
the greatest relative amaunt af guarantee losses. This could indicate a reluctance
on the part af at least same banks to disclose on the balance sheet a farm af
aetivity that is now seen to be partially speculative.
By contrast, in the case af manufacturing firms, a relatively smaller partion
of the amount af guarantees, as compared ta loans, was written off. This could
stern largely from the faet that guarantees are granted primarily ta large firms.
Another possible explanation is that nanbank lenders have been more careful than
banks in analysing credit risk.
The household sector has thus far caused a relatively small amount ofwrite-
offs. There appear to be a number of reasons for this. First, the collateral/loan
ratia on these laans is usually adequate from the bank's standpoint. Seeond,
households cannot go bankrupt and thus. cannot escape from their debts even when
the collateral is realized. This forces households to deal with their debts to the
very end. Third, households' ineame has not yet fallen very significantly relative
to debt service costs.
15Ofthe year-end total afnonperforming assets and write-offs (gross nonperfor-
ming assets), banking groups wrote off slightly more than a quartef. The
corporate sector was marked by surprising uniformity since ane-third af grass
nanperforming assets were written off in each industry (Table 2)6.
Only just aver 10 per cent af households' nonperforming assets were written
off. Loans ta households accounted for less than seven per cent af bankS' total
write-offs.
Chart 2. Breakdown of banking groups" loans and guarantees


















Chart 3. Breakdown by industry of banking groups' corporate
loans and guarantees, nonperforming assets and
write-offs, 31 Dee. 1992
















5 For these calculations, it is assumed that all write-offs have derived from nonperforrning
assets.
6 Write-offs on loans and guarantees amounted to 13-37 per cent af grass nonperforming
assets, depending on the bank. The variations by sector and industry were even greater.
165 Nordic comparison
10 comparing the Nordic countries it was necessary ta rely on parent-bank data,
as consolidated data are not available for alI the countries. Data on nonperfarming
assets are not published on Norwegian banks, and in Denmark the cancept is not
even defined as yet.
Nonperforming assets and soft loans of Swedish banks together totalled SEK
99 biIlion at end-1992. Write-offs on loans and guarantees amounted to SEK 70
billion. Problem assets and related write-offs, together with loan losses, amounted
to 18.5 per cent af the loans to the publie. These figures do not include SEK 30
billion worth af problem assets held by institutions that specialize in housing
loans.
It is impossible ta obtain ratios that are precisely comparable with thase af
Finnish banks. Finnish parent banks' grass nonperforrning assets and other zero-
interest assets amounted ta 17.5 per cent af laans to the publie. Mter write-offs of
loan losses, net ·problem loans amounted to 10.8 per cent af Swedish banks' loans
to the publie; for Finnish banks the carresponding figure was 12.5 per cent.
Under the Banking Supervision Office's accounting regulations, Finnish
banks were also obliged to write off probable loan losses at end-1992. For tax
purposes, only write-offs on actual losses (claims that are proved ta be
uncollectable) are deductible from the loan portfolio. This probably did not have
a significant effect on banks' writedown rates in 1992 because af their negative
financial results. The manner in which individual banks have conformed to
accounting regulatians varies in Finland as in other countries, thus making
interbank comparisons most difficult.
Of Swedish banks' tota1 loan write-offs in 1991, 80 per cent represented
probable loan losses; in Norway the comparable figure has been 50 per cent in
recent years. 1n their notes to financial statements, Swedish and Norwegian banks
include the amount af probable loan loss write-offs for prior years that have
become actual losses during the year. The notes also show the amount of
previously written off 10ans that has been recovered. The Banking Supervision
Office in Finland does not require the breakdown of loan losses into actual and
prabable losses in connection with year-end financial statements.
Nordic parent banks' write-offs on loans and guarantees in relation to lending
ta the public are compared in Chart 4. It should be kept in mind, however, that
percentage figures based on lending to the publie are higher than those based on
the stock af loans ar total balance sheet, for example.
1n Finland and Sweden loan losses have soared. Last year Swedish banks'
loan losses amounted to nearly eight per cent of loans to the publie, while for
Finnish banks the carresponding figure was over five per cent. 1n NOf\Vay the
trend in loan losses was reversed after the peak year of 1991, but even there the
banking crisis is not considered ta have ended. Danish banks' loan losses rose last
year to their level of 10 years ago (Chart 4).
17The timing af changes in laan-lass accounting regulatians in the Nordic
countries shows up clearly in the chart. In Narway the regulations were changed
twice, in 1987 and 1991. Sweden's regulations were changed in 1991 and
Finland's in 1992. ln Denmark there were no changes in laan 10ss accounting in
the 1980s and early 1990s.
Chart 4. Parent banks" write-offs in reiation to lending
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Over the past couple af years same FIM 100 billion's warth af banks' exposures
has been nonperforming for a sharter ar longer period af time. Df this amount,
banks have written off nearly FIM 30 billian io the course af two years. Despite
the write-offs, banks' nonperfarming assets stilI amounted to FIM 55 billion at the
end af 1992, which will lead to substantial future loan losses for banks.
The most serious debt-servicing problems are faced by firms in the domestic
sector of the ecanomy, whose nonperfarming assets amount to some 15 per cent
ofexpasures on average. The carresponding figure for manufacturing firms is less
than five per cent.
The analysis of loan losses in 1992 clearly indicates the comparatively
stronger position afmanufacturing firms in this respect. Only justQver 10 per cent
of total losses on loans ta 'domestic firms are attributable to manufacturing firms.
Construction and real estate business accounted for 45 per cent af the total. Loans
to households have sq far resulted in a camparatively smalI amaunt af 10an losses
for banks.
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